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Abstract 
The civil application of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO) has been misapplied by the lower courts, but the statute can be improved by 
incorporating elements that will make the statute a better tool for justice.  It is evident 
from examining the procedural limitations of the statute and important case law that the 
securities fraud gap, terrorism financing, and difficulties for indirect victims are three 
critical subjects that need to be addressed by enhancing RICO.  Flaws and shortcomings 
of the RICO statute have led to inconsistencies in court rulings.  The expansive language 
of RICO can be limited to reduce the culpability of foreign sovereigns and violators of 
personal use copyright infringement.  Upon a survey of seven possible solutions, this 
thesis determines that the best solution would be for Congress to amend the law.  The 
creators of RICO could refine and clarify the language and implement the features 
necessary to broaden RICO so it can fulfill its maximum potential.  Data was collected by 
reviewing research, case statistics, academic journals, and court cases. 
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Law and order exist for the purpose of establishing justice and when they fail in this 
purpose they become the dangerously structured dams that block the flow of social 
progress. 
 —Martin Luther King, Jr.  
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Redefining the RICO Statute 
Potential Avenues for Improvement 
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) is a statute 
designed to prosecute and convict criminal organizations. Because of the complex 
structure of a criminal enterprise, it is difficult to convict the leaders without RICO 
(Pierson, 2012).  RICO is valuable because it is a broad and expansive statute.   
Three main issues with RICO to examine are the ambiguous language of the 
statute, court ruling inconsistencies, and lack of breadth of the statute.  The first problem 
demonstrates the inherent flaws with RICO that require the statute to be redefined so that 
it can be construed in accordance with the will of Congress (Brady, 1986; Nybo, 2013; 
Pierson, 2013).  The inconsistencies in court rulings demonstrate the need for further 
plain and clear language.  In addition, a group of scholars believe that the RICO statute 
should be broadened so a greater variety of unlawfully acting parties can be brought to 
justice (Geisler, 2010; Weiss, 2010; Blakey & Gerardi, 2014).  The resolution to all three 
of these problems is a solution in which certain elements of the statute are better defined 
and others are expanded. 
History and Application of RICO 
Origination of RICO 
The United States Congress enacted RICO as a part of the Organized Crime 
Control Act of 1970 to help in the fight against organized crime.  RICO was “designed to 
penetrate organizations and impose liability on those who orchestrate criminal acts but 
insulate themselves with layers of underlings and bureaucracy” (Pierson, 2012, p. 524).  
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The statute was created in reaction to the control and influence that the Mafia had on the 
business world as it operated inside and outside of the realm of legitimate business 
operations (Weiss, 2010).  RICO was created to combat the infiltration of legitimate 
business by organized crime (Blakey, 2012).  RICO has two different functions: 
authorizing the government to prosecute and enabling private plaintiffs to bring suits 
against alleged violators of the law.  The criminal section of RICO grants the government 
the authority to apply criminal penalties to the leaders of organized crime, and the civil 
section of RICO empowers victims to recover damages from the misconduct of criminal 
organizations (Pierson).  Ultimately, the goal behind the creation of RICO was to “protect 
society and the economy from the ill effects of organized crime” by giving power to the 
victims and government” (Nybo, 2013, p. 23).  
Use of RICO  
The civil section of RICO provides an opportunity for victims to create claims 
against entities in violation of the act.  Civil actions can be made against commercial 
organizations even if they are not related to an enterprise that is solely criminal (Cotham 
& Campbell, 1982).  The reason behind offering remedies for RICO in civil court was 
due to the prevalence of organized crime at the creation of the statute.  The Senate 
Judiciary Committee emphasized that an attack should be made on all fronts in the fight 
against the economic powers of racketeering organizations (Geisler, 2010).  Civil court 
RICO actions have the potential to be used in cases ranging from securities fraud and 
commercial bribery, to theft and violent crime.  The RICO civil statute is an extremely 
valuable tool for compensating victims because it grants remedies up to triple the amount 
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of damages plus attorney fees.  RICO is an attractive opportunity for the plaintiff to 
obtain justice because it gives the advantages to him or her.  The plaintiff gets to choose 
the federal forum, use federal rules of evidence and discovery, and use the expansive 
venue provisions (Cotham & Campbell).  The goal behind offering private civil remedies 
for RICO is to protect “the honest businessman who is damaged by unfair competition 
from the racketeer businessman” (Anza v. ISS Corp., 2006, p. 473).  
Current Stading of RICO 
Prosecutors employ RICO to combat crime because it imposes severe sanctions 
and necessitates proving only mens rea for the predicate crimes (Bagley, Hurley & 
Mancuso, 2007).  The RICO civil statute is a valuable tool utilized to fight white collar 
crime.  In 2010, nine hundred fifty-five civil RICO cases were filed, and between 2001 
and 2010, almost five times more civil RICO cases were initiated than criminal RICO 
cases (Pierson, 2012).  An update to the Pierson study done between the years of 2005 
and 2011 showed similar results.  Between 2005 and 2011, two hundred twenty-seven 
opinions were rendered on RICO cases; 69% were civil and 31% were criminal (Pierson, 
2013).  In the span of the study, 2006 represented the year with the most cases, and an 
average of 22.5 decisions were made per year (Pierson, 2013).  
 Civil claims with RICO are an attractive option because civil RICO offers an 
award of treble damages, a broad choice of venue, and it can even be applied in class 
action suits (Cooney, Lavelle, Shariati, 2010).  Plaintiffs have a broad choice of venue 
because RICO claims can be brought against an entity in any jurisdiction as long as the 
entity resides, has an agent located in, or transacts business in that jurisdiction according 
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to 18 U.S.C. Section 1965(c) (Cooney).  A significant number of civil RICO cases are 
class actions, and because of recent case law development making the elements more 
understandable, more class action suits are expected in the future (Pierson, 2013).  
Nationwide class action suits with other laws usually face a challenge with choice-of-law 
concerning fraud and deception laws, but class action civil RICO claims need to prove 
only the predicate acts, so class action suits are potentially more effective with RICO 
(Cooney).   
Most civil RICO cases have been brought by or against businesses, which may 
indicate that it is being wielded in accordance with Congress’s intent: to combat 
sophisticated business frauds (Pierson, 2013).  However, about 18% of civil RICO cases 
are claims that are not based on the intended use of RICO; 9% of cases are brought 
against law enforcement by individuals convicted for crimes, and the other 9% of cases 
were brought by individuals trying to settle “trivial personal agreements” (Pierson, p. 
222). 
The frivolous application of civil RICO cases can be demonstrated from the 
success rate of the plaintiffs.  In civil RICO cases, plaintiffs win only 17% of the time 
(Pierson, 2013).  Despite the low success rate for plaintiffs, when they do win, the 
defense earns a big payout.  For example, some cases had settlements of $218 million, 
$177 million, and $121.8 million with the costs of attorney’s fees, which have amounted 
to almost $30 million in one case (Pierson). 
Because civil cases only require preponderance of the evidence as opposed to the 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard in criminal cases, it is less arduous to investigate and 
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prove guilt; this is essential in white collar cases because it is harder to assess intent and 
determine who knew the crime was being committed (Pierson, 2012).  Civil cases are 
also much less expensive than criminal cases because defendants have less procedural 
protections and cases are resolved quicker (Pierson).  Remedies in civil cases can be 
applied in a variety of ways that are more applicable to companies and organizations, 
which ensures that the jobs of innocent people are protected and the continuation of 
essential services to the public (Pierson).  With the encouragement of high profits, civil 
RICO inspires knowledgeable victims and the finest private attorneys to form cases with 
the best resources to punish the instigators of white-collar crime (Pierson).  Despite the 
increased use of civil RICO, it has had varied applications due to its ambiguous language, 
which may indicate a problem (Pierson).   
Problem Identification 
RICO is a complex statute that is not well defined; it lacks clarity and has been 
applied in different courts regarding the plaintiff’s standing in the case (Lloyd, 2007; 
Cutler, 1990).  Even the creators of the law recognized that the language in RICO is very 
broad; the Organized Crime Control Act offers the provision that RICO “shall be 
liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes (OCCA, 1970; Cotham & 
Campbell, 1982, 226).  Early after its creation, law practitioners recognized that future 
court cases would determine its effectiveness.  Cotham and Campbell say that with any 
amendments to the law, “decisions yet to be rendered will explain more fully what the 
tool is good for and who can use it” (p. 263).  Due to the broad language, some authors 
argue that the language of the powerful statute needs to be better defined (Brady, 1986; 
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Nybo, 2013; Pierson, 2013); others believe that the effectiveness of RICO needs to be 
expanded to serve justice in more situations (Geisler, 2010; Weiss, 2010; Blakey & 
Gerardi, 2014).  Another problem with the statute is how it has been applied 
inconsistently in different circuits of the federal court system. 
The law’s construction has been altered due to the expansive language of RICO. 
The Supreme Court has had to repeatedly enforce the broad interpretation of standing of 
the victims.  In order to sue under civil RICO, the victim must prove a violation of 
Section 1962, injury to his or her business or property, and causation of the injury by the 
violation (Bagley, Hurley & Mancuso, 2007).  The plaintiff must further demonstrate that 
the predicate act is “independently wrongful under RICO” (Bagley, p. 945).  In a 1994 
case, the Supreme Court eliminated the Seventh District’s restriction that the racketeering 
enterprise be accompanied by an economic motive (Bagley, p. 942).   
Coppola and DeMarco (2012) believe that RICO’s ambiguity and the judiciary’s 
tendency to interpret it liberally has allowed RICO to expand beyond its intended 
purpose.  Attempts to brandish RICO creatively include suing the Catholic Church 
leaders for covering up instances of sexual abuse, suing British Petroleum for concealing 
flaws in deep-water drilling plans, and suing Pfizer for marketing an epilepsy drug for 
prescriptions not approved by the Food and Drug Administration (Coppola & DeMarco).  
The victims of the Pfizer case were awarded $47.4 million, which was then tripled under 
the RICO treble damages provision further explaining the ambition of creative lawyers 
and witnesses in need to take advantage of the civil RICO provision (Coppola & 
DeMarco).  It is clear that civil RICO has been exploited in ways that congress could not 
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have imagined; however, the issue is determining whether the law should be better 
defined or left open for a variety of uses.  Each of the three main issues related to the 
RICO law can be analyzed by considering specific examples that prove the statute is 
partially deficient.   
The Statute Needs To be Better Defined 
A consistent attitude among legal commentators is that the far-reaching language 
in the statute needs to be better defined when considering the volume of civil cases, the 
broad language, copyright infringement, and foreign sovereigns (Nybo, 2013; Geisler, 
2010; Pierson, 2013; Ross, 2010; Corrigan, 2010). 
Large Volume of Civil RICO Cases 
Some argue that the RICO civil statute has been and is continually abused 
because courts are not using enough discretion when determining which parties can bring 
suit (Nybo, 2013).  According to a study done in 2002, one hundred eighty-five RICO 
cases between 1999 and 2001 were decided by the federal appellate courts, and of those 
cases, 78% were civil and 22% were criminal (Bucy, 2002).  This study shows that 
private litigants may have more motivation to pursue justice than federal prosecutors.  
This may be due to limited resources of the Department of Justice (Nybo).  Further 
analysis on this study shows that only three of the one hundred forty-five civil RICO 
cases resulted in a final victory for the plaintiffs (Bucy).  Based on the success rate of the 
civil RICO cases and the disparity in the number between civil and criminal cases, the 
issue is not related to resource allocation but to a high number of private plaintiffs filing 
frivolous claims (Nybo). 
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American Bar Association Task Force Study 
The expansive utilization of civil RICO is not a recent discovery.  In 1985 in the 
case of Sedima v. Imrex, Justice Byron White cited a study done by the American Bar 
Association Task Force which found that only 9% of two hundred seventy civil RICO 
cases were about allegations related to criminal activity generally associated with 
professional criminals.  Of the remaining cases, 40% involved securities fraud and 37% 
were related to commercial or business common-law fraud (Sedima v. Imrex, 1985).  
These statistics indicate that RICO has become less of an instrument wielded for fighting 
organized crime and more of an instrument to bring simple fraud cases against legitimate 
business enterprises (Nybo, 2013).  The motivation behind civil RICO litigation is 
certainly related to the opportunity to earn treble damages, which leads to many frivolous 
civil RICO cases (Nybo).  The wide and varied use of RICO demonstrated in this study is 
directly related to the broad language in the statute.  
Broad Language 
Within RICO, many expressions have very broad definitions (Geisler, 2010).  For 
instance, a person is defined as “any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or 
beneficial interest in property” (18 U.S.C. §1962(a); Geisler, 2010, p. 614).  An 
enterprise can be any individual, partnership, corporation, or legal entity (18 U.S.C. 
§1961(4)).  A “pattern of racketeering” requires only two acts of racketeering activity (18 
U.S.C. §1961(5)).  The term “racketeering activity” must be one of the eighty federal 
criminal acts listed in Title 18, and each of the eighty crimes will have its own definition 
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also (18 U.S.C. §1961(1); Geisler).  Three important elements that could be better 
defined are pattern, proximate cause, and enterprise. 
Definitions of Pattern, Proximate Causation, and Enterprise 
The main issues discussed in RICO cases are pattern, proximate causation, and 
enterprise, which account for 69% of all RICO issues discussed (Pierson, 2013).  The 
difficulty in applying these issues in civil RICO cases is part of the reason that RICO has 
been “overused, underused, and maligned” (Pierson, p. 225).  
In order to prove a RICO violation, the plaintiff must demonstrate a pattern or a 
continual series of violating predicate acts.  Courts have had different interpretations of 
what constitutes a pattern of racketeering activity.  The pattern requirement for RICO is 
considered vague and non-intuitive when compared to most other criminal statutes 
(Pierson, 2013).  However, the Supreme Court has given enough guidance, according to 
Pierson, to make this element of RICO predictable. 
The second issue is with determining “whether the plaintiff’s alleged injury has 
been proximately cause by the defendant’s alleged conduct” (Pierson, 2013, p. 223).  
Based on three important Supreme Court cases, a clear standard for what it takes to prove 
proximate causation now exists (Pierson, p. 246).  One of the most difficult elements to 
prove by the plaintiffs is that their injury is directly related to the defendant’s alleged 
violation of RICO (Pierson, p. 241).  Also, the plaintiff must prove that other factors 
besides the alleged RICO misconduct did not contribute to the injury (Pierson, p. 246).  
Finally, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she is the primary victim and most 
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deserving of the damages (Pierson, p. 246).  It may also be beneficial for the plaintiff to 
prove that no other statute is in place to address the injury at issue (Pierson, p. 246). 
The third issue is determining what constitutes an enterprise in the RICO 
provisions. The lower federal courts often interpret the enterprise element very narrowly, 
while the Supreme Court has often applied a very broad definition of enterprise (Pierson, 
2013).  Even if a group is informally formed and loosely organized, it is still considered 
an enterprise under the law (Pierson).  In addition to the broad language of the statute, 
another issue is related to copyright infringement. 
 
Copyright Infringement 
The purpose of copyright law is to encourage the creation of artistic works as well 
as encourage access to those creative works to the public (Ross, 2010).  According to 
Ross, copyright infringement should be removed from the list of predicate acts as a part 
of RICO, or Congress should limit the RICO liability for copyright infringement to the 
most significant commercial offenders.  Many people in the younger generation (tweens 
to those in their mid-twenties) believe that copyright laws are “unfair or inapplicable” for 
private use (Ross, 2012, p. 57).  Recognizing copyright infringement as a predicate crime 
gives civil courts too much power by granting them access to treble damages (Ross, 
2010, p. 71).  By granting copyright holders this much power, too much authority is 
given to the monopolistic entities and not enough to the public interest (Ross, p. 63).  
Presently, the penalties for copyright infringement are very severe.  The RICO statute has 
already been broadly interpreted to include conduct beyond that of its intended purpose 
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by ignoring its legislative history (Ross, p. 62).  If the penalty for infringements are too 
severe, copyright owners will have increased monopolistic rights over creative items and 
the public will have less access to those works (Ross).   
The purpose of RICO was to offer remedies to those injured by criminal 
enterprises; however, the courts have expanded and broadly interpreted the RICO statute 
beyond what Congress intended (Ross, 2010).  Ross proposes that Congress should 
amend the law to remove copyright infringement as a predicate act for RICO, or simply 
limit the exploitation of RICO in the cases of copyright infringement to those “defendants 
that engage in large-scale, commercial piracy and not those who copy for private use” (p. 
63). 
The criminal side of RICO enables prosecutors to apply discretion when 
determining whom to prosecute, while the government is limited to prosecuting “the most 
severe, profit seeking conduct” (Ross, 2010, p. 125).  In contrast, copyright owners have 
no obligation to show the same discretion under the civil section (Ross, p. 125).  
Ross (2010) suggests that increasing the pattern requirement, narrowing the 
enterprise requirement, limiting penalties, or simply removing copyright infringement 
completely from the list of predicate acts in section 1961(1) will increase RICO’s 
effectiveness.  The pattern requirement should be increased to the point that only a full 
scale criminal enterprise can be sued.  The enterprise element should be narrowly 
interpreted, especially to exclude those who simply participate in peer-to-peer sharing 
(Ross).  Removing copyright infringement from RICO is a viable option because the 
Anti-Counterfeiting Consumer Protection Act already protects against counterfeiting 
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goods and services and organized trafficking (Ross, p. 126).  However, if the federal 
legislators believe counterfeiting should remain a part of RICO, it should be limited to 
include only cases of commercial and for profit counterfeiting, not for personal use 
counterfeiting (Ross, p. 63).  Similar to how Ross believes that small scale counterfeiting 
should not be a predicate act to RICO, Corrigan argues that foreign sovereigns should be 
immune to civil RICO claims (Ross, p. 56; Corrigan, 2010). 
Foreign Sovereigns 
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FISA) regulates suits against 
foreign sovereigns by permitting U.S. courts jurisdictional authority over foreign 
sovereigns for only civil claims (Corrigan, 2010).  This raises an issue with civil suits in 
relation to RICO.  Because civil RICO claims require the plaintiff to prove a criminal 
element as a part of the predicate acts to determine the presence of racketeering, a 
discrepancy exists as to whether a foreign sovereign should be immune to any civil RICO 
suit.  According to Corrigan, foreign sovereigns should be immune to “civil RICO claims 
because they are not subject to jurisdiction for the requisite underlying criminal act 
needed to succeed on a RICO claim” (Corrigan, p. 1478).  Those with a dissenting 
opinion believe that as long as a foreign sovereign is proven to be acting in a commercial 
capacity, which is an exception to FISA, then the sovereign may not claim immunity 
(Corrigan, p. 1484).  A sovereign is deemed to have acted in a commercial capacity when 
it is acting in a private, business focused capacity as opposed to a political or regulatory 
capacity (Corrigan, p. 1485).  Outside of a commercial capacity, the FISA statute grants 
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civil jurisdiction to U.S. courts so that U.S. citizens can resolve ordinary legal disputes 
with foreign sovereigns (Corrigan, p. 1484).  
 This difficulty in determining whether U.S. courts have jurisdictional authority to 
determine civil RICO cases shows an inherent flaw with the FISA statute and the 
complexity of the RICO statute. This discrepancy should be addressed so that courts can 
rule consistently, international relations are not negatively affected, and the will of 
Congress is followed. 
 In his article, Corrigan (2010) highlights two cases where two circuits ruled 
differently on the submission of a FISA suit with a civil RICO claim.  The Tenth Circuit 
in the decision of Southway v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 2003, held that a foreign state 
was not immune from a civil RICO claim because it had determined that the commercial 
activity exception applied, so immunity was denied to the defendant (Corrigan, p. 1490).  
Corrigan notes four flaws in the reasoning of this court, and he points out an opposing 
opinion from the Sixth Circuit case of Keller v. Central Bank of Nigeria (2002).  In this 
case, the court determined that commercial exception did not apply, so immunity was 
granted (Corrigan, p.1493-1494).  The ruling of the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the 
Tenth Circuits ruling in three ways.  First, due to FISA, a foreign sovereign cannot be 
indicted based on the wording of the statute; Congress’s silence on criminal jurisdiction 
for sovereigns led the court to assume it did not have the authority to decide criminal 
matters (Corrigan, p. 1489).  Secondly, the provisions in FISA endorse criminal 
prosecution only with an existing international agreement, and in this case, none existed 
(Corrigan, p. 1494).  Lastly, since civil RICO requires that the defendant be indictable 
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and FISA does not permit sovereigns to be indicted in the U.S., the court determined that 
the sovereign must be immune (Corrigan, p. 1488).  A later decision by the Fifth Circuit 
also held that sovereigns are immune to civil RICO because they cannot be indicted 
(Corrigan, p. 1495).  
 Corrigan (2010) suggests that all courts should adopt the analysis of the Sixth 
Circuit Court because it reconciles the language of the FISA statute the best and aligns 
with its intended purpose.  By ruling in this manner, the judicial practice of the U.S. 
would better align with international standards (Corrigan, 1499).  The flaws with the 
interpretation of FISA may be fixed with a more clear definition and language in the civil 
RICO statute.  Corrigan also notes that this consistent granting of immunity to sovereigns 
for civil RICO cases would serve the best interest of private parties, sovereigns, and U.S. 
international relations (Corrigan, p. 1503). The inconsistent rulings of the Sixth and 
Tenth Circuits are not rare occurrences; three different circuits also had inconsistent 
rulings on the element of standing. 
Inconsistancies in Civil RICO Cases 
Different decisions by the Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts 
demonstrate that the RICO civil statute needs to be redefined and its intent better 
explained by Congress (Lloyd, 2007).  This problem needs to be fixed to ensure 
consistent judicial interpretation of the law.  The broad construction sometimes enables 
unpredictable and unanticipated claims to gain access to the federal courts (Coppola & 
DeMarco, 2012). 
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According to RICO Section 1964(c), a person or his business must be injured in 
conjunction with a predicate act of RICO in order to be able to sue for damages (Lloyd, 
2007).  Even though the Supreme Court has set clear precedents to interpret the statute 
broadly, courts have still tried to reduce the scope of the statute (Lloyd).  The following 
three courts applied standing stipulations in different ways for each case relating to civil 
RICO. 
The Eleventh Circuit Court: Grogan v. Platt, 1988 
In this case four Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agents and the estate of 
two slain Special Agents were suing a criminal enterprise under civil RICO to obtain 
money for physical injuries from a shootout (Grogan v. Platt, 1988).  According to the 
court manuscripts, the case relied on one main question: “Does RICO's private civil 
action provision, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1964(c), permit recovery for the economic aspects of 
personal injuries inflicted by predicate acts involving murder?” (Grogan v. Platt, p. 845).  
The plaintiffs argued that the personal injuries and deaths constituted an injury in the 
statute (Grogan v. Platt).  However, the Eleventh Circuit Court disagreed claiming that 
the words “business or property” limited the types of injuries that a plaintiff could sue 
for, so the court determined the agents did not have standing in the case (Grogan v. Platt, 
p. 845; Geisler, 2010).  In the following year, the Eleventh Circuit made the same 
conclusion in the case of Rylewicz v. Beaton Services Ltd., 1989, that the language 
“injury to business or property” does not include physical, mental, or emotional suffering 
(Geisler, p. 619).  
The Seventh District Court: Doe v. Roe, 1992 
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The Doe v. Roe case presented to the Seventh District Court was between a 
divorce lawyer and his client.  In the words of the court, “we are asked to determine 
whether a plaintiff may bring a civil action under RICO where she alleges that her 
divorce attorney defrauded her into having sexual relations with him in lieu of payment 
for his legal services” (Doe v. Roe, 1992, p. 765).  The court determined, in conjunction 
with prior district courts’ rulings, that civil RICO action cannot be based solely on 
physical or emotional injuries (Doe v. Roe, p. 767).  Again it was determined that the 
plaintiff did not have standing in the case. 
The Ninth Circuit Court: Diaz v. Gates, 2005 
The Ninth Circuit Court took on an opposing opinion to those of the Doe case and 
Grogan case.  In the case of Diaz v. Gates, Diaz (2005) was suing the Los Angeles Police 
Department for supposedly being falsely imprisoned.  He claims that his alleged false 
conviction caused him to lose possible employment opportunities (Diaz v. Gates).  The 
Ninth Circuit granted Diaz standing because he “properly alleged an injury to business or 
property within the meaning of civil RICO” (Lloyd, 2007, p. 138).  Their reason for 
granting standing was that RICO provides a cause for action when “concrete financial 
losses” occur (Lloyd, p. 138).  
 Conclusion from these three cases. These three cases indicate a problem with 
the civil RICO Statute.  The statute needs to have a better definition of standing.  
According to Lloyd (2005), the judiciary has proven that it is incapable of consistently 
applying the standing element in civil RICO in the multitude of districts.  Multiple 
solutions are available to solve the problems related to how civil RICO should be 
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interpreted.  The problem can be addressed by the Circuit and District Courts, the 
Supreme Court, or the Legislature.  In addition to the claim that certain terms need to be 
better defined, is the claim that the statute’s language should be extended so that its use is 
even more broadened.   
The Statute Should Be Broadened 
Certain courts have imposed standing restrictions on who can submit RICO 
claims, and these restrictions conflict directly with mandates from both the Supreme 
Court and Congress (Lloyd, 2007).  Without victims being able to sue for damages from 
offenders, victims will not have the opportunity to receive justice.  Broadening the RICO 
statute can remedy some concerns about the recovery of damages for indirect victims, 
non-actionable securities fraud cases, suits against organizations that finance terrorism. 
The cases of MSMK v. Chase and Sedima v. Imrex also give valuable insight into how the 
civil RICO statute can be enhanced.   
Indirect Victims 
The Supreme Court decision for the case of Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity 
Co., 2008, helped to turn RICO into a valuable tool for keeping corporate industries 
honest (Geisler, 2010).  Following the Bridge case, plaintiffs do not need to prove that 
they relied on the defendants misrepresentations to establish elements in civil RICO cases 
in instances concerning mail and wire fraud (Brown v. Cassens Transport Co., 2008).  
According to Geisler, a direct victim of a predicate act of racketeering should not be the 
only party that can claim a remedy in a civil RICO case; an indirect victim, like an honest 
competitor who loses market share to a racketeer, should have access to damages when 
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no direct victim is available or the direct victim is not capable of making a claim 
(Geisler).  
 Legislative and judicial “tort reform” has made it difficult for individual 
consumers to seek damages from corporate wrongdoers (Geisler, 2010, p. 628).  This 
allows corporate wrongdoers to take advantage of inadequate regulatory oversight to take 
market share away from honest competitors (Geisler).  In his article, Geisler suggests that 
the Court should reshape its proximate cause analysis “to recognize the intended victims 
of corporate fraud: honest competitors that have lost market share due to fraud, 
deception, and misrepresentation” (p. 612).  RICO should be made available for indirect 
victims in the same way that organizations that sponsor terrorism should be liable under 
RICO.  
Terrorism Financiers 
Because terrorism is an important and pressing issue today, civil RICO should be 
employed as a means to punish those enterprises that fund terrorism (Weiss, 2010).  Civil 
RICO should not be constrained but instead, its breadth should be guaranteed by 
legislative action to allow for civil suits against organizations responsible for terrorism 
funding (Weiss).  Even though the RICO statute allows for a variety of cases, the lower 
courts have continually tried to restrict the “types of enterprises that could qualify for 
criminal or civil liability” (Weiss, p. 1134).  
 One specific terrorism group is al Qaeda.  Al Qaeda raises money from many 
different sources including legitimate business practices like investments and donations 
but also from various criminal schemes (Weiss, 2010).  According to many scholars, the 
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most important source of funding for al Qaeda comes from charities (Weiss).  Some of 
these charities are simply fronts for terrorism financing while others are authentic 
charities that have been infiltrated by terrorist operatives who steal and redirect funds to 
terrorists (Weiss).  
 The Seventh Circuit has recognized that the “only way to imperil the flow of 
money and discourage the financing of terrorist acts is to impose liability on those who 
knowingly and intentionally supply the funds to the persons who commit the violent acts” 
(Boim v. Quaranic, 2002, p. 1021).  Following the terrorist act on September 11, 2001, 
Congress passed the Patriot Act of 2001, which amended RICO to include a larger list of 
predicate acts (Weiss, 2010).  The additional predicate acts included those from the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which includes the 
criminalization of providing material support to terrorist organizations (Weiss, 2010).  
 While addressing the breadth and variability of RICO, the Supreme Court has 
stated that it does not have any intention to confine it because Congress was well aware 
of the weapon that it created for curbing criminal enterprises; due to this interpretation, 
any attempt to limit the reach of RICO should remain with the creators of RICO (Sedima 
v. Imrex, 1985; Weiss, 2010).  The Supreme Court has no intention to eliminate the 
private action available under RICO because Congress has expressly provided it (Weiss).  
The Supreme Court has emphasized that “the fact that RICO has been applied in 
situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It 
demonstrates breadth” (Sedima v. Imrex, p. 499).  
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 According to Weiss, the war on terror should not solely take place in the sphere of 
national security, criminal prosecution, and counterintelligence but also in the realm of 
public opinion and public consciousness (Weiss, 2010).  This author also suggests that 
Congress should consider amending the statute to extend RICO liability specifically to 
financial supporters of terrorism (Weiss).  Congress is justified to improve this statute 
because it will enable victims of terrorism to join the battle against funding terrorist 
organizations while also achieving the restitution and retribution that they deserve 
(Weiss).  Criminal enterprise does more than simply break a law; it is an organization that 
propitiates and creates profit from crime, so this conduct deserves greater punishment and 
deterrence (Weiss).  Weiss suggests that Congress should expand the already broad 
statute to be even broader to include the financing of terrorism. 
RICO is intentionally broad.  The drafters of RICO did recognize that this 
statute is a “wide net” that would most likely trap those who are specifically members of 
organized crime syndicates (Headley, 1985, p. 419).  Courts must recognize that 
“organized criminality takes many forms, and that Congress is fully empowered to 
provide generous relief for victims even of ‘respected’ enterprises’ egregious conduct” 
(Headley, p. 448).  The intentionally broad statute should not have a gap like it does now 
especially with reference to the issue of securities fraud (Gerardi, 2014). 
Securities Fraud Gap 
In March of 1995, Representative Christopher Cox proposed an amendment to the 
Private Securities Litigations Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) with the goal to limit the use 
of RICO in conjunction with securities fraud suits (Blakey & Gerardi, 2014).  The 
REDEFINING THE RICO STATUTE   25 
 
purpose for amending the statute was to eliminate any possible duplication of suits under 
both RICO and the PSLRA (Blakey & Gerardi).  Despite the intention of Congress to 
remove overlap, a gap now exists between the two statutes that leaves certain victims of 
securities fraud unable to seek recourse for the damages from the fault of infringing 
parties (Blakey & Gerardi).  The gap exists due to “a series of unfortunate rulings from 
the federal courts” (Blakey & Gerardi, p. 441).  With the current political climate, Blakey 
and Gerardi do not expect congress to solve this problem, but they insist that the federal 
appeals courts or ultimately the Supreme Court needs to eliminate and corral this gap 
(Blakey & Gerardi).  This gap needs to be closed so that victims of securities fraud can 
have the opportunity to plead their case in the federal courts (Blakey & Gerardi).   
 Due to the language in the two statutes, the courts should not have found any 
incompatibility between RICO and the securities laws (Blakey & Gerardi, 2014).  The 
PSLRA has provisions that preserve other remedies in other suits, and RICO has a 
provision that prevents encroachment on other statutes (Blakey & Gerardi).  The resulting 
litigation from the creation of PSLRA is not in line with the intention of Congress’s 
intent when it created the statute was to reduce unnecessary RICO suits when an 
opportunity for recovery exists under other securities laws like the PSLRA is available 
(Blakey & Gerardi).  The outcome was not only the elimination of overlap between the 
two sets of laws but the creation of a gap where both the RICO and the securities laws 
cannot be applied (Blakey & Gerardi).  Courts are “improperly denying victims of 
crimes” access to federal courts which is the opposite of what Congress intended in the 
passing of the PSLRA (Blakey & Gerardi, p. 472).  The economic downturn of 2007 and 
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2008 indicate that the nation needs more deterrence for fraud as well as opportunities for 
fraud victims to receive justice (Blakey & Gerardi).  RICO needs to be revitalized in the 
realm of securities fraud; this needs to be done by the federal courts of appeal to realign 
RICO with its mission or else the Supreme Court needs to intervene on this issue (Blakey 
& Gerardi). 
MLSMK Investment Co. v. JP Morgan Chase & Co, 2011.  A case that took 
place in the Second Circuit Court in 2008 demonstrates another issue with the Civil 
Section of RICO and the PSLRA amendment.  MLSMK Investment Company invested 
$12.8 million with Bernard Madoff Investment Securities (Madoff), which was owned 
and managed by Bernard Madoff who manipulated the funds as a part of his famous 
Ponzi scheme (MLSMK v. Chase, 2011).  Madoff made legitimate trades with JP Morgan 
Chase (Chase) and Chase Bank, and Chase made money from fees paid by Madoff for 
legitimate banking activities.  MLSMK filed suit with Chase seeking damages by 
claiming that Chase conspired with Madoff in violation of RICO.  MLSMK claimed that 
Chase had knowledge of the illegitimate activities of Madoff because Chase at one point 
was invested in Madoff, but later removed all of its investments. Even though Chase 
removed all of its investments in Madoff, it continued to do business with Madoff by 
managing his accounts and making legitimate trades.  MLSMK claims that Chase knew 
of Madoff’s illegal dealings and did nothing to protect the victims of Madoff’s scheme, 
but instead chose to protect Madoff and profit from the fees associated with serving him 
in legitimate business services. 
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 The Second Circuit entirely dismissed the plaintiff’s claim based on Rule 12 (b) 
(6); the appeals court in the Second District affirmed the ruling because the section of the 
PSLRA bars racketeering claims based on securities fraud (MLSMK v. Chase, 2011).  
The Court applied other district court opinions to conclude that the language in PSLRA 
“unambiguously” bars all claims based on securities fraud conduct (Buscher, 2012, p. 
207).  Buscher believes that the court incorrectly assessed the goal behind the legislation 
and that the case should not have been dismissed.  Based on the commentary in the 
Committee Report on PRSLA, it appears that some of the authors of the law did not 
intend to bar meritorious claims such as the one by MLSMK (Buscher). 
Federal case law also barred the plaintiff MLSMK from bringing a claim under 
the Securities Exchange Act associated with aiding and abetting, so the only other option 
for recovering damages in civil court against Chase was via RICO (Buscher, 2012).  With 
PSLRA excluding any civil RICO cases associated with securities fraud, many victims 
are left with no private cause of action (Buscher).  
 According to a senate report, the PSLRA was intended to curb frivolous claims 
and encourage lawyers to pursue valid claims for some Senators, but others claim that 
goal of the legislation was to protect investors in the capital markets (S. Rep. No. 104-98, 
1995; Buscher, 2012).  However, Buscher claims that these intentions are isolated and 
that the overall theme of the legislation is to promote meritorious claims.  And no doubt 
remains that the claims of MLSMK against Chase are meritorious (Buscher).  Dissenting 
Senators Sarbanes, Bryan, and Boxer believed that in order to balance the barring of 
frivolous claims with meritorious claims, a provision in the law is needed that restores 
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liability for aiding and abetting securities fraud (Buscher).  Concerning the PSLRA and 
the case of MLSMK, the court missed the overall goal behind the amendment, which was 
to simply deter meritless claims, not to throw out worthy cases (Buscher).  According to 
Senator Dodd and other dissenting Senators, securities fraud victims should not be left 
without private action as a repercussion of this act, and while deterring meritless claims, 
laws are needed to ensure that “legitimate victims can continue to sue and can recover 
damages quickly” (S. Rep. No. 104-98; Buscher, p. 211).  The case of MLSMK v. Chase 
demonstrates a problem with RICO and securities fraud, but the case of Sedima v. Imrex 
is valuable for comprehending the Supreme Court’s understanding and application of the 
law. 
Sedima S.P.R.L v. Imrex Co., 1985 
The case of Sedima v. Imrex is a very important case for considering the 
implications of the civil RICO statute.  This court case involved two parties that were 
partners in a business venture. The plaintiff, Sedima alleges that the defendant, Imrex, 
was inflating bills and expenses to cheat Sedima out of proceeds by collecting on 
expenses that did not exist (Sedima v. Imrex, 1985).  This Supreme Court case decided 
whether the civil RICO statute permits suits against defendants who have not been 
convicted of criminal RICO charges and whether damages other than racketeering 
injuries can be recovered (Sedima v. Imrex).  Considering that the civil court has a lower 
burden of proof, it does not make sense to require a criminal prosecution, so the Court 
decided that a criminal prosecution is not necessary in order for a civil RICO suit to take 
place (Sedima v. Imrex).  The Court also decided that because the language in RICO is 
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very broad, injuries need not to have resulted from a criminal enterprise, but suits may be 
brought against legitimate businesses when they can be found at fault for breaching any 
of the predicate acts (Sedima v. Imrex). 
In the U.S. Supreme Court case of Sedima v. Imrex (1985), the  
court noted that private action under RICO was beginning to evolve into 
something quite different from the original conception of its enactors: 
Originally designed to decrease the activity of mobsters and organized 
criminals, RICO was beginning to become a common tool for everyday fraud 
cases brought against 'respected and legitimate' enterprises. (Buscher, 2012, p. 
208) 
Civil RICO prior to Sedima v. Imrex.  Prior to the case of Sedima v. Imrex, 
RICO was limited by the courts, which had decided to restrict which plaintiffs could 
bring claims under the statute, and four limitations were consistently used (Brady, 1986).  
The first was that the defendant must have had some sort of connection to organized 
crime (Brady).  The second was that “the plaintiff must allege a unique inquiry in 
addition to the injury flowing from the predicate acts” (Brady, p. 1121).  Third, the 
enterprise had to be separate from the defendant or from the pattern of racketeering 
(Brady).  Fourth, the defendant had to have already been criminally convicted of a 
predicate act (Brady).  The district and circuit courts have placed these restrictions 
assuming that Congress did not intend to create such a far-reaching law (Brady).  
Different courts have chosen to enforce the law by recognizing that the language of the 
statute is intentionally broad (Brady).  In truth, Congress chose to enact RICO with non-
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specific language, so the restrictions that have been employed by the courts are not in 
alignment with Congress’s intentions (Brady). 
 Civil RICO after Sedima v. Imrex.  The case of Sedima v. Imrex gave the 
Supreme Court the chance to eliminate some of the inconsistencies among courts as well 
as remove the major restrictions on RICO (Brady, 1986).  Due to the decision, plaintiffs 
are no longer required to “allege a prior conviction and a separate racketeering injury” 
(Brady, p. 1153). 
 Ultimately, concerning the RICO statute, Congress has not communicated its 
intentions as well as most parties interpreting it would like (Brady, 1986).  However, 
Congress has not made any major changes to the statute other than adding and removing 
predicate acts.  Congress has the power to change how the statute is interpreted by 
introducing new legislation or amending prior legislation, so if Congress is not pleased 
with how RICO is being interpreted, then Congress alone must take action to correct the 
misapplication (Brady). 
Solutions for the Ambiguity and Limitations of RICO 
Three main remedies that have been utilized to curb the misuse of the civil section 
of RICO include self-policing, narrow statutory construction, and simply repealing the 
civil section of RICO (Nybo, 2013).  Some other solutions include, allowing the districts 
to have their separate interpretations narrowly construing the statute, a Supreme Court 
Ruling, and having Congress amend the law.   
Self-Policing 
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Self-Policing would be the simplest remedy to reduce the amount of frivolous 
RICO cases filed.  Currently, the United States Attorney’s Office is successfully 
regulating itself regarding criminal RICO claims because federal prosecutors are required 
to get formal approval from the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice (Dept. of 
Justice, 1997).  However, this solution does not guarantee results because for civil suits, 
self-policing has been regarded as a conflict of interest (Nybo, 2013).  The legal 
profession has come under heavy criticism for self-regulation because lawyers cannot be 
expected to regulate their members effectively (Nybo).  This solution does not address 
the need to broaden the statute to address the issues with terrorism financing and 
securities fraud.  Similar to the solution to encourage courts to self-regulate is the idea to 
let District Courts continue to rule differently. 
Allow Circuit Courts the Freedom to Define the Statute 
The decisions made by the Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts each set 
precedent for the inferior courts in each of their circuits.  Application of the civil RICO 
standing statute could continue to be determined by the circuit courts.  This option would 
be simple to institute and would not require any significant changes.  The circuit courts 
can continue to make rulings consistent with their prior opinions even though they 
disagree with other circuits.  The substantial problem with this solution is that 
inconsistencies remain between circuits in interpretation of the standing statute for RICO 
(Lloyd, 2005). This solution also does not address the changes that are needed in the 
language of the statute.  Another option would be to give the courts a general instruction 
to narrowly construe the civil RICO statute.   
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Narrow Construction 
Another possible remedy would be for the courts to narrowly construe the RICO 
provisions to actual criminal organizations (Nybo, 2013).  One example of when a district 
court attempted to narrowly construe the injury element of RICO was in the case of 
Sedima v. Imrex (Nybo).  The Second Circuit Court decided in this case that any injury in 
a civil RICO claim should be specifically related to an activity that RICO was designed 
to deter not just injuries related to the predicate acts (Sedima v. Imrex, 1984).  The 
Supreme Court rejected the narrow interpretation of the injury clause because it 
determined that the goal of RICO was not just to deter criminal enterprises but also the 
predicate acts (Sedima v. Imrex, 1985).  Though a narrow construction applied by all the 
courts would be a simple remedy, it would require congressional approval because the 
Supreme Court clearly endorsed the liberal interpretation of RICO in civil suits (Sedima 
v. Imrex, 1985; Nybo).  Ultimately, this solution addresses only the need to narrow the 
statute in certain instances while it entirely neglects the need to extend the statute; it also 
goes against the directive of the Supreme Court.   
Repeal 
A simple solution would be to repeal the civil RICO statute or at least remove the 
treble damages provision.  However, the statute has demonstrated some success in the 
prosecutions and deterrence of criminal enterprise, so the simplest option would not be 
the most beneficial.  With the continual threat of organized crime, repeal is not the 
correct remedy, but enforcing a specific rule of court procedure may help reduce 
frivolous claims (Nybo, 2013).  
REDEFINING THE RICO STATUTE   33 
 
Strict Enforcement of Rule 11 
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides the option to impose 
sanctions on attorneys who file papers with the court that are not supported by reasonable 
inquiry or otherwise lack merit (Nybo, 2013).  Rule 11(b) specifies that when an attorney 
submits a signed document to the court, he or she certifies that the document 
(1) is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause 
unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, 
defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a 
nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or 
for establishing new law; (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support 
or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a 
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and (4) the 
denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically 
so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information. (Fed. R. 
Civ. P., 2007, 11(b) (1)-(4)) 
 According to the Supreme Court, the goal of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings in 
District Court (Cooter v. Hartmarx, 1990).  Nybo believes that Rule 11 is the best 
solution to reduce manipulation of civil RICO, and some circuit courts have already 
utilized Rule 11 to punish litigants whose pleadings misused the rule’s standards (Nybo, 
2013).  Even though Rule 11 is a good option as a remedy, due to its peculiar language, 
multiple issues persist with the application of Rule 11 (Nybo, p. 37-43).  Nybo concludes 
that Rule 11 will not successfully remove all malfeasance of RICO, but district courts 
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need to “utilize its expansive discretion in punishing the parties (attorneys and clients 
alike) who are responsible” for the unashamed exploitation of RICO (p. 49).  Courts need 
to utilize Rule 11 to protect their dockets and the legitimacy of the RICO statute (Nybo).  
In order to properly deter misuse while maintaining the functionality of RICO, Rule 11 is 
a good place to punish fraudulent RICO claimants (Nybo).  The enforcing of Rule 11 is 
practical and necessary, but it does not address the reasonable and appropriate use of 
RICO and the expansion for improvement.  
Supreme Court Ruling 
The Supreme Court has the power to set precedent for all of the inferior courts 
including the circuit courts.  The benefit of the Supreme Court making a decision on the 
definition of standing for civil RICO is that its implementation will be uniform after its 
ruling.  However, the judicial branch cannot correct the inherent imperfections of RICO 
and rewrite the law (Lloyd, 2007).  Ultimately, the best solution to succinctly enhance the 
civil RICO statute would be to amend the law. 
Legislative Action 
Congress has the authority and ability to clarify the terms of RICO swiftly and 
definitely.  From his concurring opinion in Diaz v. Gates (2005) Judge Reinhardt 
suggested that Congress “take another look at RICO and consider amending the statute so 
as to limit it to its original purpose" (Lloyd, 2007, p. 140).  If nothing is done, the 
inconsistencies will continue, and courts will continue to disagree on the rendition of the 
civil RICO statute (Lloyd).  The only downside with the legislature redefining the law is 
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the political process of drafting and passing the law and the challenges that it involves, 
but the benefit of this application will solve the current problem with RICO. 
Congress can solve the problem by better defining the standing requirements for 
civil RICO and using more specific and detailed language that will better explain the 
purpose of the law for proper execution by the courts.  By adding specific definitions for 
the standing, pattern, proximate causation, and enterprise elements, the statute will not be 
misinterpreted and inconsistently construed.  If Congress were to amend the statute, it 
would have the opportunity to remove copyright infringement liability for small scale 
offenders as well as make a decision on the culpability of foreign sovereigns in the 
context of civil RICO.  Congress would have the unquestionable authority to ensure that 
indirect victims have the ability to sue under RICO.  Weiss (2010) suggests that Congress 
extend the RICO statute so that financial supporters of terrorism can be liable under civil 
RICO.  With litigation, the securities fraud gap could be closed to ensure right of action 
for securities fraud victims (Blakey & Gerardi, 2014).  Unlike all the other solutions, 
legislative action by Congress would be capable of addressing every issue with the 
statute.  Congress has the authority to change the statute as well as the power to influence 
how the statute is interpreted by the courts.   
Conclusion 
Pierson’s study on the civil RICO statute demonstrated that it has been employed 
relatively little yet maligned much (2013).  Civil RICO is not yet fully developed, which 
is why it has not been fully utilized, but as it matures, it will grow into its usefulness 
(Pierson).  The broad language of the RICO statute has led to problems with its 
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interpretation and application (Pierson).  However, the powerful statute can be expanded 
to include terrorism financing, securities fraud, and indirect victims.  The District and 
Circuit courts have continually applied a narrow interpretation of the statute, which goes 
against the will of the Supreme Court and Congress (Pierson).  Legislative action would 
correct this problem and the others associated with the statute.  According to the Supreme 
Court, Congress was aware of the weapon that it created for curbing criminal enterprises, 
and any attempt to change the language or interpretation of RICO should remain in the 
hands of its creators (Sedima v. Imrex, 1985; Weiss, 2010).  Solving the problems related 
to civil RICO would open the door for those who have been cut off from justice and help 
serve the original purpose of the law as created by Congress, which is to punish and deter 
organizations that commit crime.  
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